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We analyze ﬁrst-price auctions with two asymmetric bidders, where
the winner can oﬀer the good for resale to the loser. One bidder has
a private value for the good, the other bidder—the speculator—has
zero value. We show that, independently of the resale market rules,
the speculator’s expected proﬁt equals zero. Nevertheless, the oppor-
tunity for resale can create a role for an active speculator, destroy
the eﬃciency of the auction, and increase the initial seller’s expected
revenue.
1 Introduction
A seller can often not prevent her goods from being resold in the future. It is
therefore important to study properties of standard sales mechanisms when
resale is possible. Furthermore, models of markets with resale should allow
for entry of agents with no (consumption) value for the goods traded in the
market. Such agents might be called speculators because their only reason
for buying is reselling. One would like to understand how the presence of
speculators aﬀects the market, and whether or not speculators can make
proﬁts.
We analyze the role of speculators in ﬁrst-price auctions with resale. To
keep the analysis as simple as possible, we consider an environment with
just two bidders, one bidder with a private value and one speculator; our
qualitative results continue to hold in a model with multiple speculators.
Both bidders can participate in the auction. Subsequently, the winner can
oﬀer the good to the loser. No information becomes public after the auction
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1beyond what is revealed via the winning bid. I.e., we consider a ﬁrst-price
auction as implemented via a Dutch auction.
The resale market can take any form: the resale seller may be able to
oﬀer the good in an optimal mechanism (given her posterior beliefs), she
may be restricted to use a simple mechanism like posting a ﬁxed price, or
bargaining might enfold, to give just a few examples. Each resale market
aﬀects the bidding incentives in the auction diﬀerently. Our solution concept
is perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the multi-stage game that begins with the
auction and ends after the resale market has closed.
In the ﬁrst part of the paper we show that, independently of the resale
market rules, the speculator’s expected proﬁt equals zero in any equilibrium.
To understand the signiﬁcance of this result, suppose that the private-value
bidder ignores possible entry of a speculator. She would then bid 0 and
expect to win the auction. Hence, by making a small bid the speculator
could win for sure and possibly make a large proﬁt by reselling. We show
that the speculator’s equilibrium expected proﬁt nevertheless equals zero.
This contrasts the result that speculators can make large proﬁts in second-
price and English auctions, for a wide range of resale mechanisms (Garratt
and Tr¨ oger, 2003).
In the second part, we provide a detailed analysis of the ﬁrst-price auc-
tion with a speciﬁc resale market rule: the resale seller oﬀers the good
by posting a ﬁxed price; i.e., the resale mechanism is an optimal take-it-
or-leave-it oﬀer. This mechanism is particularly simple and is also—given
the posterior beliefs in an equilibrium—optimal for the resale seller across
all conceivable mechanisms if the distribution for the bidder’s value has a
monotone hazard rate.
We construct an equilibrium for the game where the resale mechanism
is an optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer and show that the equilibrium is essen-
tially unique. In equilibrium, the speculator wins the auction with positive
probability, the post-resale allocation is ineﬃcient with positive probability,
and the expected revenue of the initial seller is positive. In the absence
of a resale opportunity, the private-value bidder would win the auction for
sure, the allocation would be eﬃcient, and the initial seller would collect
no revenue. Therefore, the opportunity for resale changes the properties
of the ﬁrst-price auction in three important ways: it creates a role for an
active speculator, it destroys the eﬃciency of the auction, and it increases
the initial seller’s expected revenue.
The result that a resale opportunity can be detrimental to eﬃciency
contradicts the widespread belief that a seller who is interested in eﬃciency
(e.g., a government agency) should embrace resale. Second-price and En-
2glish auctions also have equilibria such that the opportunity for resale is
detrimental for eﬃciency (Garratt and Tr¨ oger, 2003). A crucial diﬀerence
is that in second-price and English auctions with a resale opportunity an
eﬃcient equilibrium continues to exist.
Attracting additional bidders to an auction is traditionally considered
desirable (Bulow and Klemperer, 1996). Our results conﬁrm this sentiment
in the revenue dimension, but not in the eﬃciency dimension. Sellers who
are interested in eﬃciency should be wary which additional bidders they are
attracting.
Haile (1999, 2003), Gupta and Lebrun (1999), and Krishna (2002, Ch.
4.4) analyze ﬁrst-price auctions with resale. None of these papers considers
possible entry of speculators. Gupta and Lebrun (1999) consider asymmet-
ric bidders and assume common knowledge of values in the resale market. In
this model, the post-resale allocation is eﬃcient while it would be ineﬃcient
in the absence of a resale opportunity; i.e., resale is beneﬁcial for eﬃciency.
Haile (1999, 2003) analyzes resale in symmetric environments where some
buyers cannot participate in the initial auction and/or at the time of the
initial auction each bidder is uncertain about her own value.1 Assuming
Haile’s symmetric separating equilibria, the opportunity for resale is clearly
beneﬁcial for eﬃciency. Krishna (2002, Ch. 4.4) considers asymmetric bid-
ders and a resale market where, as in our model, the auction winner makes a
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the loser. He shows that the game has no eﬃcient
equilibrium, but stops short of actually constructing an equilibrium. For
more literature on auctions with resale, see Haile (2003) and Garratt and
Tr¨ oger (2003).
In Section 2 we describe the market and the show that the private-value
bidder’s bid function is weakly increasing in the winning range. In Section
3 we show that speculation is not proﬁtable. In Section 4 we analyze resale
via an optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. In Section 5 we make concluding
remarks.
2 Model
We consider two risk-neutral agents, buyer 1 and speculator s, who are in-
terested in a single indivisible good.2 The good is initially owned by a seller
1Note that in Haile’s terminlogy, the term “use value” stands for our term “value.”
His term “valuation” refers to the opportunity cost of not winning the initial auction.
2Including multiple speculators into the model would leave the qualitative results un-
changed, but complicate the notation. Equilibria with multiple active speculators can
3who oﬀers it via a ﬁrst-price auction without reserve price.3 The buyer has
the random value ˜ µ1 2 [0;1] for the good. The speculator has value 0 for the
good. Let F(¢) denote the distribution function for ˜ µ1. We assume that F(¢)
is continuous, F(0) = 0, F(1) = 1, and F(¢) has a positive and bounded
density on [0;1]. Before period 1, the buyer privately learns the realiza-
tion of her value µ1 = ˜ µ1. In period 1, a ﬁrst-price auction without reserve
price takes place. The buyer and the speculator simultaneously submit bids
b1;bs ¸ 0. The highest bidder becomes the new owner of the good. To avoid
some technicalities, we assume that if there is a tie then the buyer becomes
the winner. We also assume that the bid of the loser remains private af-
ter the auction; i.e., we consider a ﬁrst-price auction as implemented via a
Dutch auction (see Section 5 on changing this assumption).
There is a resale period 2 where the period-1 winner can oﬀer the good
to the loser. Period-2 payoﬀs are discounted according to some factor ± · 1.
If the buyer is the period-1 winner then it is optimal for her to consume
the good herself immediately; we will assume this in the following. If the
speculator wins (i.e., b1 < bs) she can oﬀer the good for resale. We do not
make any assumptions on the resale market rules: either the speculator or
the buyer may be a able to commit to a mechanism, or the agents may
bargain.
Let us consider period 2 assuming that the speculator has won in period
1. Then, bs is common knowledge and the speculator’s posterior belief about
the buyer’s value can depend on bs. On the other hand, b1 is not payoﬀ
relevant in period 2. Therefore, we can assume that the actions taken by
the buyer and the speculator in period 2 determine an expected payment
function P(¢ j bs) and a probability-of-sale function Q(¢ j bs) such that the
buyer’s expected payment in period 2 is P(µ1 j bs), and her probability of
obtaining the good in period 2 is Q(µ1 j bs). If period 2 includes multiple
time-discounted stages at which the good may be sold and payments may
be made, Q(µ1 j bs) and P(µ1 j bs) are deﬁned as the present value (at the
beginning of period 2) of the probability of sale, and payment, respectively.
By the revelation principle, the buyer’s incentive compatibility con-
straints
8bs ¸ 0; µ1;µ0
1 2 [0;1] :
Q(µ1 j bs)µ1 ¡ P(µ1 j bs) ¸ Q(µ0
1 j bs)µ1 ¡ P(µ0
1 j bs) (1)
exist, with each speculator’s expected proﬁt being equal to zero.
3We expect our qualitative results to remain valid if the auction is augmented by a
small reserve price. A revenue-maximizing reserve price would shut out the speculator,
but would also fail to achieve an eﬃcient allocation.
4are satisﬁed. Moreover, voluntary participation in the resale market implies
the participation constraints
8bs ¸ 0; µ1 2 [0;1] : Q(µ1 j bs)µ1 ¡ P(µ1 j bs) ¸ 0: (2)
Optimality and participation requirements for the speculator’s resale actions
may be introduced as well, but they would play no role for our results. A
standard argument using (1) implies that Q(µ1 j bs) and P(µ1 j bs) are weakly
increasing in µ1.
A strategy for the buyer is given by a bid function b1(¢). A strategy for
the speculator is given by a random bid ˜ bs (we allow for randomization of
the speculator because otherwise there may be no equilibrium). Let H(¢)
denote the distribution function for ˜ bs. Given the speculator’s strategy, the
expected payoﬀ of the buyer with value µ1 and bid b1 is
u1(b1;µ1) = H(b1)(µ1 ¡ b1) (3)
+(1 ¡ H(b1)) ± E[Q(µ1 j ˜ bs)µ1 ¡ P(µ1 j ˜ bs) j ˜ bs > b1]:
Given the buyer’s strategy, the expected payoﬀ of the speculator with bid
bs is
us(bs) = Pr[bs > b1(˜ µ1)]
³
±E[P(˜ µ1 j bs) j bs > b1(˜ µ1)] ¡ bs
´
: (4)
A proﬁle (b1(¢);˜ bs;P(¢ j ¢);Q(¢ j ¢)) is called a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
if (1), (2),




Pr[˜ bs 2 argmax
b¸0
us(b)] = 1 (6)
are satisﬁed.
In Lemma 1 we show that in equilibrium the buyer’s bid function is
weakly increasing in the winning range. The main idea of the proof is to use
the incentive compatibility constraints (1) in order to show that the buyer’s
payoﬀ function has increasing diﬀerences; i.e., that the payoﬀ gain from a
bid increase is increasing in the buyer’s value.
Lemma 1 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;P(¢ j ¢);Q(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
and let H(¢) denote the distribution function for ˜ bs. Then
8µ1;µ0
1 2 [0;1] : if H(b1(µ0
1)) > 0 and µ1 > µ0
1 then b1(µ1) ¸ b1(µ0
1):
5Proof. We begin by showing that
8b1;b0
1 ¸ 0; µ1;µ0
1 2 [0;1] : (7)
if b1 > b0
1; µ1 > µ0
1; and Pr[b1 ¸ ˜ bs] > Pr[b0
1 ¸ ˜ bs]












(Q(µ1 j bs)µ1 ¡ Q(µ0
1 j bs)µ0
1
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1 < ˜ bs · b1](1 ¡ ±)(µ1 ¡ µ0
1) > 0;




1 = b1(µ1). Then we have Pr[b1 ¸ ˜ bs] > Pr[b0
1 ¸ ˜ bs] because
otherwise type µ0
1 could improve her expected payoﬀ by lowering her bid
from b1 to b0
1. From (5) we get
u1(b1;µ1) ¡ u1(b1;µ0




This contradicts (7) and thereby completes the proof of the lemma. QED
For any given equilibrium (b1(¢);˜ bs;P(¢ j ¢);Q(¢ j ¢)) and all bs ¸ 0,
deﬁne4
Á(bs) = supfµ1 2 [0;1] j b1(µ1) < bsg:
4Let sup; = 0.
6By Lemma 1, the set of buyer types against which the speculator wins with
bid bs is [0;Á(bs)) or [0;Á(bs)], for all bs with H(bs) > 0. Thus, in equilibrium
we have
8bs ¸ 0; H(bs) > 0 : us(bs) = F(Á(bs))
³
±E[P(˜ µ1 j bs) j ˜ µ1 · Á(bs)] ¡ bs
´
:
Now consider any perfect Bayesian equilibrium and a speculator’s bid bs that
has a positive probability of winning. After winning with bs, the speculator’s
posterior distribution Π(¢ j bs) for the buyer’s value is given for all µ1 2 [0;1]
by




Finally, note that if the resale mechanism is an optimal take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer function T(¢) then
8bs ¸ 0 : T(bs) 2 argmax
p¸0
(1 ¡ Π(p j bs))p; (9)
where for bids bs that win with probability 0 the distribution Π(¢ j bs) is
arbitrary. The direct mechanisms that correspond to the optimal take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀers are given as follows.
8µ1 ¸ T(bs) : P(µ1 j bs) = T(bs); Q(µ1 j bs) = 1; (10)
8µ1 < T(bs) : P(µ1 j bs) = 0; Q(µ1 j bs) = 0: (11)
Note that (10) and (11) imply (1) and (2). A strategy-belief proﬁle
(b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢))
is called a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers
if conditions (5), (6), (8), (9), (10), and (11) are satisﬁed.
Optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers are a particularly important example
because these mechanisms are resale-revenue maximizing for the resale seller
among all conceivable mechanisms, provided F(¢) has a monotone hazard
rate. Indeed, if the hazard rate for F(¢) is strictly increasing, then the same
is true for the posteriors Π(¢ j bs) deﬁned by (8) and we can apply Myerson’s
(1981) result.
3 Speculation is not proﬁtable
In this section we show that the expected payoﬀ of the speculator is zero in
any equilibrium. Lemma 2 shows that in the winning range the buyer will
7not bid above her value. Lemma 3 shows that with positive probability the
speculator will make arbitrarily small bids. Thus all buyer types (except
µ1 = 0) bid below their values (Lemma 4). Proposition 1 concludes that the
speculator’s expected payoﬀ is 0 in every equilibrium.
Lemma 2 below shows that in the winning range the buyer will not bid
above her value. This follows because, starting from a candidate above-
value bid, a deviation to a bid equal to her value replaces a sure loss by
a non-negative payoﬀ in the event that the speculator bids in the interval
between her value and the candidate bid. Note that in the event where the
speculator overbids the buyer, lowering her bid does not change the buyer’s
payoﬀ because the losing bid is not observable to the speculator.
Lemma 2 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;P(¢ j ¢);Q(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
and let H(¢) denote the distribution function for ˜ bs. Then b1(µ1) · µ1 for
all µ1 2 (0;1] with H(b1(µ1)) > 0. If H(b1(0)) > 0 then b1(0) = 0.
Moreover, Á(bs) ¸ bs for all bs with H(bs) > 0.
Proof. Suppose that b1(µ1) > µ1 > 0. Then a deviation to the bid b1 = µ1 is
proﬁtable because
u1(µ1;µ1) ¡ u1(b1(µ1);µ1)
= H(µ1)(b1(µ1) ¡ µ1) + (H(b1(µ1)) ¡ H(µ1)) ¢
³
± E[Q(µ1 j ˜ bs)µ1 ¡ P(µ1 j ˜ bs) j µ1 < ˜ bs · b1(µ1)] ¡ (µ1 ¡ b1(µ1))
´
(2)
¸ H(µ1)(b1(µ1) ¡ µ1) + (H(b1(µ1)) ¡ H(µ1))(b1(µ1) ¡ µ1)
¸ H(b1(µ1))(b1(µ1) ¡ µ1) > 0:
In the same manner one shows that for type µ1 = 0 a deviation to b1 = 0 is
proﬁtable.
To prove the moreover-part, let µ1 < bs for some bs with H(bs) > 0.
Then b1(µ1) < bs by what we have just shown. Therefore, Á(bs) ¸ bs. QED
The next lemma shows that the speculator will make arbitrarily small
bids. Suppose this were not so. Then buyers with low values never win the
original auction but always wait for resale. However, the resale price must be
suﬃciently high so that the speculator recovers the price paid in the original
auction. Due to the participation constraint for the resale mechanism, no
buyer’s expected resale payment can be higher than her value. Therefore,
among the buyer types who wait for resale, those with a relatively high value
must make a resale payment above the speculator’s lowest price paid in the
8original auction. For those buyers, it is proﬁtable to deviate to a higher bid
that makes them win the original auction with positive probability.
Lemma 3 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;P(¢ j ¢);Q(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Then 8b > 0 : Pr[˜ bs < b] > 0.
Proof. Suppose that there exists bs > 0 such that Pr[˜ bs < bs] = 0. Let bs
be maximal with this property. Let u¤
s ¸ 0 denote the equilibrium expected
payoﬀ for the speculator; i.e., Pr[us(˜ bs) = u¤
s] = 1.
First consider the case H(bs) = 0 (i.e., no atom at bs). By assump-
tion, there exists a sequence (bm)m2I N such that bm ! bs as m ! 1, and
us(bm) = u¤
s and bm > bs for all m. Deﬁne µ¤ = infb>bs Á(b). Lemma 2
implies µ¤ ¸ bs > 0. Moreover, an indirect argument using Lemma 1 shows
that
8µ1 < µ¤ : b1(µ1) · bs: (12)
For all b > bs with us(b) = u¤
s we have
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Taken together, the inequalities (13), (14), and (15) imply that
8b > bs; us(b) = u¤
s : E[P(˜ µ1 j b) j
bs
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There exists ˆ b > bs such that
8b 2 (bs;ˆ b) : Pr[µ¤ · ˜ µ1 · Á(b) j
bs
2
· ˜ µ1 · Á(b)] < »=3; (17)
9and ˆ µ 2 (bs=2;µ¤) such that
8b > bs : Pr[ˆ µ · ˜ µ1 · µ¤ j
bs
2
· ˜ µ1 · Á(b)] < »=3: (18)
Taken together, (17) and (18) imply that
8b 2 (bs;ˆ b) : Pr[ˆ µ · ˜ µ1 · Á(b) j
bs
2
· ˜ µ1 · Á(b)] <
2»
3
This together with P(˜ µ1 j b) · 1 (from (2)) and (16) yields
8b 2 (bs;ˆ b); us(b) = u¤
s : E[P(˜ µ1 j b) j
bs
2




This implies P(ˆ µ j b)] ¸ bs=± + »=3 because P(¢ j b) is weakly increasing by
(1). Now let b1 2 (bs;minfˆ b;bs + ±»=3g). Then
u1(b1; ˆ µ) ¡ u1(b1(ˆ µ); ˆ µ)
= Pr[˜ bs · b1]
³
ˆ µ ¡ b1 ¡ ±E
h
Q(ˆ µ j ˜ bs)ˆ µ ¡ P(ˆ µ j ˜ bs) j ˜ bs · b1
i´
¸ Pr[˜ bs · b1](bs + ±»=3 ¡ b1) > 0;
which contradicts (5).
In the case H(bs) > 0 the proof is similar. One deﬁnes µ¤ = Á(bs) and
shows that the deviation b1 = bs is proﬁtable for some type ˆ µ < µ¤. QED
Lemma 4 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;P(¢ j ¢);Q(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Then b1(µ1) < µ1 for all µ1 2 (0;1], and b1(0) = 0.
Proof. Suppose that b1(µ1) ¸ µ1 > 0. Then b1(µ1) > 0, implying H(b1(µ1)) >
0 by Lemma 3. Now Lemma 2 shows that b1(µ1) = µ1. Finally, a computa-
tion similar to that in the proof of Lemma 2 shows that a deviation to the
bid b1 = µ1=2 is proﬁtable—contradiction. The proof for the case µ1 = 0 is
similar. QED
The proposition below shows that the speculator’s expected payoﬀ equals
zero; i.e., she cannot make proﬁts.5 Suppose she does make positive proﬁts.
5The result that the speculator cannot make proﬁts does not mean that she would
abstain if there were a small positive participation cost. Assuming the participation cost
is incurred simultaneously to the bid, we expect an equilibrium where the speculator ran-
domizes between participating and abstaining, and, conditional on participation, obtains
a positive expected proﬁt.
10Then by Lemma 3 even arbitrarily small bids of the speculator have a proba-
bility of winning that remains bounded away from 0. Therefore, buyers with
small value must be bidding 0. Also, the resale payment of some 0-bidding
buyer types must be bounded away from zero for arbitrarily small bids of
the speculator because otherwise the speculator could not make proﬁts. For
these buyer types, a deviation to a small positive bid can be shown to be
proﬁtable.
Proposition 1 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;P(¢ j ¢);Q(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilib-





s = maxb¸0 us(b) and suppose that u¤
s > 0. By Lemma 3 there
exists a sequence (bm)m2I N such that bm ! 0 as m ! 1, and us(bm) = u¤
s
for all m. Note that bm > 0 for all m because otherwise u¤
s = us(0) = 0
(using our assumption that the buyer wins all ties). Deﬁne µ¤ = infb>0 Á(b).
We have
Pr[˜ µ1 · µ¤] = lim
m!1Pr[˜ µ1 · Á(bm)] ¸ u¤
s > 0:
Therefore, µ¤ > 0. Note that Lemma 1 implies
8µ1 < µ¤ : b1(µ1) = 0: (19)
There exists ˆ b > 0 such that
8b 2 (0;ˆ b) : Pr[µ¤ · ˜ µ1 · Á(b)] < u¤
s=3
and ˆ µ 2 (0;µ¤) such that
Pr[ˆ µ · ˜ µ1 · µ¤] < u¤
s=3:
Therefore, for all b 2 (0;ˆ b) with us(b) = u¤
s we have
u¤
s · E[1˜ µ1·Á(b)P(˜ µ1 j b)]
= E[1˜ µ1<ˆ µP(˜ µ1 j b)] + E[1ˆ µ·˜ µ1·µ¤P(˜ µ1 j b)] + E[1µ¤<˜ µ1·Á(b)P(˜ µ1 j b)]






E[1˜ µ1<ˆ µP(˜ µ1 j b)] > u¤
s=3:
11This implies P(ˆ µ j b)] > u¤
s=3 because P(¢ j b) is weakly increasing by (1).
Now let b1 2 (0;minfˆ b;±u¤
s=3g). Then
u1(b1; ˆ µ) ¡ u1(0; ˆ µ)
= Pr[˜ bs · b1]
³
ˆ µ ¡ b1 ¡ ±E
h
Q(ˆ µ j ˜ bs)ˆ µ ¡ P(ˆ µ j ˜ bs) j ˜ bs · b1
i´
¸ Pr[˜ bs · b1](±u¤
s=3 ¡ b1) > 0;
which contradicts (5). QED
Having shown that speculation is not proﬁtable, we now turn to the
question how exactly the auction is distorted by the presence of a speculator.
4 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium with
optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers
From now on we focus on a speciﬁc resale mechanism: an optimal take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer. We proceed by establishing in Lemma 5 to Lemma 12 various
properties that equilibria must have and then show that an essentially unique
equilibrium exists (Proposition 2). The lemmas’ proofs make frequent use of
the fact that arbitrarily small bids of both players have a positive probability
of winning (this follows from Lemma 3 and 4).
Lemma 5 below shows that positive types make positive bids; i.e., the
buyer’s bid function is strictly increasing at 0. If not then the speculator
would make positive proﬁts from any suﬃciently small positive bid.
Lemma 5 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Then for all µ1 > 0 we have b1(µ1) > 0.
Proof. Suppose that b1(µ¤) = 0 for some µ¤ > 0. Because the speculator can
make the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer T = µ¤=2, we have
us(bs) ¸ (F(Á(bs)) ¡ F(µ¤=2))±µ¤=2 ¡ F(Á(bs))bs
for all bs > 0 and thus
lim inf
bs!0;bs>0
us(bs) ¸ (F(µ¤) ¡ F(µ¤=2))±µ¤=2 > 0;
in contradiction to Proposition 1. QED
12The three main properties of equilibrium that were mentioned in the
Introduction follow from Lemma 5. The initial seller’s expected revenue
is positive. With positive probability, the speculator submits a positive
bid (because otherwise b1(1) = 0). After winning, the speculator makes a
positive resale oﬀer because otherwise she could not recover the price paid
in the auction. As a result, the speculator keeps the good with positive
probability so that the post-resale allocation is ineﬃcient.
The next lemma shows that the buyer’s bid function is strictly increasing.
The proof supposes that some positive bid b¤ occurs with positive proba-
bility. By bidding slightly above b¤ the speculator wins against a discretely
“better” pool of buyer types than by bidding slightly below. It is thus not
optimal for the speculator to submit any bid slightly below b¤, and thus the
buyer can improve her payoﬀ by lowering her bid below b¤.
Lemma 6 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Then for all µ1;µ0
1 2 [0;1] and µ0
1 > µ1, we
have b1(µ0
1) > b1(µ1).
Proof. In the case µ1 = 0 we have b1(µ1) = 0 < b1(µ0
1) by Lemma 4 and
Lemma 5.
Now consider the case µ1 > 0. Suppose there exists µ0
1 > µ1 with b1(µ1) =
b1(µ0
1) = b¤. Note that b¤ > 0 by Lemma 5. We have6
Á := lim
b&b¤ Á(b) ¸ µ0
1 > µ1 ¸ lim
b%b¤ Á(b) =: Á:
Using the deﬁnition of T(¢), one can show that there exists b < b¤ and T > 0
such that T(b) ¸ T for all b > b.
Also, Pr[˜ bs 2 [b¤ ¡ ²;b¤]] > 0 for all ² > 0 (because otherwise u1(b¤ ¡
²;µ1) > u1(b¤;µ1) = u1(b1(µ1);µ1) which contradicts (5)). Therefore, there
exists a sequence (bm)m2I N such that bm ! b¤ as m ! 1, and bm 2 (0;b¤)
and us(bm) = 0 for all m (using Proposition 1).









Because after bidding b¤ + 1=m the speculator can make the oﬀer T(bm)
rather than her optimal oﬀer T(b¤ + 1=m), we have for all bm > b:
F(Á(b¤ + 1
































Therefore, us(b¤+1=m) > 0 for all suﬃciently large m, contradicting Propo-
sition 1. QED
The next lemma shows that the speculator’s bid distribution is continu-
ous, except for a possible atom at 0. If there were an atom at a positive bid
b¤ then buyer types who are in equilibrium supposed to bid just below b¤
would rather deviate and win against the bid b¤. The resale oﬀer would be
more expensive then buying in the original auction because otherwise the
speculator makes losses when she bids b¤.
Lemma 7 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Then the distribution H(¢) for ˜ bs is con-
tinuous on (0;1).
Proof. Suppose that there exists b¤ > 0 where H(¢) is not continuous;
i.e., Pr[˜ bs = b¤] > 0.
Deﬁne µm = Á(b¤) ¡ 1=m for all m large enough that µm > 0. Let b =
limm!1 b1(µm). We have b = b¤ because otherwise Pr[b1(˜ µ1) 2 (b;b¤)] = 0
which would imply us((b¤ + b)=2) > us(b¤).
Note that T(b¤) > b¤=± because otherwise us(b¤) < 0. Also, T(b¤) < µm
for large m because otherwise T(b¤) ¸ Á(b¤), implying us(b¤) < 0. For large
m we have
u1(b¤;µm) ¡ u1(b1(µm);µm)
¸ H(b1(µm))(b1(µm) ¡ b¤) + Pr[˜ bs 2 (b1(µm);b¤)](¡1)
+Pr[˜ bs = b¤]((1 ¡ ±)µm + (±T(b¤) ¡ b¤)):
Therefore,
lim inf
m!1u1(b¤;µm) ¡ u1(b1(µm);µm) ¸ Pr[˜ bs = b¤](±T(b¤) ¡ b¤) > 0:
I.e., for large m type µm has a proﬁtable deviation. QED
14The next Lemma shows that the buyer’s bid function is continuous and
Á(¢) is its strictly increasing inverse. If the bid function did jump the specu-
lator would also not bid in the resulting gap of the buyer’s bid distribution.
This contradicts the assumption of optimal bidding for types just above the
jumping type.
Lemma 8 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Then the bid function b1(¢) is continuous.
Moreover, for all µ1 2 (0;1] we have Á(b1(µ1)) = µ1. Also, for all b;b0 2
(0;b1(1)] with b0 > b we have Á(b0) > Á(b).
Proof. From Lemma 4 it follows that b1(¢) is continuous at 0. Suppose






This implies Pr[˜ bs 2 (b;b1(µ¤))] = 0 because otherwise the speculator could
improve her payoﬀ by lowering her bid. But then type µ¤ can improve her
payoﬀ by lowering her bid—contradiction.






This implies Pr[˜ bs 2 (b1(µ¤);b]] = 0. But then any type µ1 > µ¤ that is suﬃ-
ciently close to µ¤ can improve her payoﬀ by lowering her bid—contradiction.
The moreover-part now follows easily using Lemma 6. QED
The next lemma describes the unique candidate for an equilibrium bid
function. The bid function is fully determined by the 0-proﬁt condition for
the speculator.
Lemma 9 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Then





Moreover, us(bs) = 0 for all bs 2 [0;b1(1)].
15Proof. For all (p2;µ1) 2 [0;1] £ (0;1], deﬁne the function g(p2;µ1) =
±(F(µ1) ¡ F(p2))p2=F(µ1). For all µ1 2 (0;1], deﬁne the function g1(µ1) =
maxp22[0;1] g(p2;µ1). By a well-known lemma, g1(¢) is continuous because
g(¢) is continuous. By Lemma 8, b1(¢) is continuous as well. Therefore, to
prove (20) it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd a set D µ (0;1] such that D is dense in
(0;1] and b1(µ1) = g1(µ1) holds for all µ1 2 D. Let
D = fµ1 2 (0;1] j us(b1(µ1)) = 0g:
Suppose D is not dense in (0;1]. Then there exist µ0
1;µ00
1 2 (0;1] such that
µ00
1 > µ0
1 and D \ [µ0
1;µ00
1] = ;; i.e., us(b1(µ1)) < 0 for all µ1 2 [µ0
1;µ00
1] by
Proposition 1. This implies Pr[˜ bs 2 [b1(µ0
1);b1(µ00
1)]] = 0, which contradicts
the optimality of the bid b1(µ00
1) for type µ00
1.
By deﬁnition of D, we have




p2 ¡ b1(µ1) = 0:
Now the moreover-part of Lemma 8 shows (20).
The moreover-part of the statement is immediate from (20). QED
The next lemma describes the candidate equilibrium take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer functions and uses monotone comparative statics to show that any oﬀer
function is strictly increasing in the speculator’s bid. The candidate oﬀer
function is uniquely determined up to a countable set of points; this will turn
out to be the only aspect of the equilibrium that is not uniquely determined.
Lemma 10 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
with optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. Then






Moreover, T(¢) is strictly increasing on (0;b1(1)]. Also, everywhere except
for a countable set of points, T (¢) is single-valued.
Proof. From (9) one directly obtains (21). Consider bs;b0
s 2 (0;b1(1)]
with bs > b0
s. Then T > T0 for all T 2 T (bs), T0 2 T (b0
s), by Edlin and
Shannon (1998, Theorem 1). Therefore, T(¢) is strictly increasing.
For any m 2 I N deﬁne the set














16Because T (bs) µ [0;1] for all bs 2 (0;b1(1)], the sets Jm are ﬁnite for all
m 2 I N. Thus, J = [m2I NJm is countable. For all bs 2 (0;b1(1)] n J,
we have supT (ˆ bs) = inf T (ˆ bs), showing that the set T (bs) is single-valued.
QED
The next lemma establishes a diﬀerential equation for the distribution
H(¢) of speculator’s bids. The distribution is determined by the condition
that the bidder’s bid is (locally) optimal for each bidder type. Using this
condition, we also prove diﬀerentiability of H(¢) up to a countable set of
points and local Lipschitz continuity.
Lemma 11 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
with optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers. For all ² > 0, the distribution function
H(¢) for ˜ bs is Lipschitz continuous on [²;b1(1)].
Moreover, H(¢) is diﬀerentiable for all bs 2 (0;b1(1)) up to a countable
set of points, and
H0(bs) =
H(bs)
±T(bs) + Á(bs)(1 ¡ ±) ¡ bs
: (22)
Proof. We have
8b1 2 (0;b1(1)]; µ1 > T(b1) : u1(b1;µ1) = H(b1)(µ1 ¡ b1)
+(H(T¡1(µ1)) ¡ H(b1))±
³
µ1 ¡ E[T(˜ bs) j b1 < ˜ bs · T¡1(µ1)]
´






T¡1(µ1) := supfbs 2 (0;b1(1)] j T(bs) · µ1g (24)
is the maximum speculator’s bid that makes the resale oﬀer acceptable for
type µ1.
Consider any b1;b0
1 2 (0;b1(1)] with b0
1 < b1. Deﬁning µ1 = Á(b1), we
have µ1 > T(b1) > T(b0
1) and thus (23) implies
0 · u1(b1;µ1) ¡ u1(b0
1;µ1)
= (H(b1) ¡ H(b0



























1 2 (0;b1(1)]; b0








±T(b1) + Á(b1)(1 ¡ ±) ¡ b1
: (25)
Analogously, one ﬁnds that7
8b1;b0
1 2 (0;b1(1)]; b0
1 < b1; Á(b0
1) > T(b1); ±T(b0
1) + Á(b0









1)(1 ¡ ±) ¡ b1
: (26)














This together with the fact that the density for F(¢) is bounded above implies
9´ > 08b1 2 [²;b1(1)] : Á(b1) ¡ T(b1) > ´: (27)
By uniform continuity of Á(¢) on the compact set [²;b1(1)], there exists » > 0
such that for all b1;b0
1 2 [²;b1(1)] with b1 ¡ b0
1 2 (0;»),
Á(b1) ¡ Á(b0
1) < ´=2: (28)
Subtracting (28) from (27) yields
9» > 0 8b1;b0
1 2 [²;b1(1)]; b1 ¡ b0
1 2 (0;») : Á(b0
1) ¡ T(b1) > ´=2: (29)
7Deﬁne µ1 = Á(b
0
1). Then (23) implies
0 ¸ u1(b1;µ1) ¡ u1(b
0
1;µ1)
= (H(b1) ¡ H(b
0





























18Now ﬁx a b¤ 2 [²;b1(1)]. W.l.o.g., » < b¤. Deﬁne ¿ = ±F(T(²))T(²) > 0.
For all b1 2 [²;b1(1)], using us(b0












1 2 [²;b1(1)]; b1 ¡ b0






¡b1 ¸ ¿ ¡ (b1 ¡ b0
1) ¸ ¿=2: (30)
Taken together, (26), (29), and (30) imply that
8b1;b0
1 2 [²;b1(1)]; b1 ¡ b0









which shows Lipschitz continuity. From (26) and (25) it is now immediate
that H(¢) is diﬀerentiable at all points in (²;b1(1)) where T(¢) is continuous,
with the derivative given by (22). Because T(¢) is strictly increasing, it is
continuous up to a countable set of points. QED
The next lemma determines the unique candidate distribution function
for the speculator’s bid. Using the previous Lemma and an additional Lip-
schitz condition, one shows that the diﬀerential equation given in the previ-
ous lemma has a unique solution.
Lemma 12 Let (b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢)) be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
with optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers and let H(¢) denote the distribution
function for ˜ bs. Then









H(bs) < 1: (33)
Proof. We have H(0) < 1 because otherwise b1(1) = 0, contradicting Lemma
5. The limit formula for H(0) follows from right-continuity of distribution
functions. One can check that (32) satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation (22)
for all but a countable set of points on (0;b1(1)), is Lipschitz continuous
on [²;b1(1)] for all ² > 0, and satisﬁes the boundary condition H(b1(1)) =
191. It remains to verify that no other distribution function satisﬁes these
requirements. Consider any small ² > 0. Note that ±T(bs) ¸ bs for all
bs 2 (0;b1(1)]. Thus, for all real numbers H; ˆ H with H > ˆ H and all bs 2
[²;b1(1)], the Lipschitz condition
H ¡ ˆ H
±T(bs) + Á(bs)(1 ¡ ±) ¡ bs
· (H ¡ ˆ H)
1
Á(²)(1 ¡ ±)
is satisﬁed. Moreover, Lemma 11 implies that H(¢) is Lipschitz on [²;b1(1)].
A standard argument in the theory of diﬀerential equations shows that these
conditions imply the uniqueness of the solution (32) on [²;b1(1)]. Because ²
is arbitrary, uniqueness on (0;b1(1)] follows. QED
The lemmas so far have shown that if an equilibrium exists then it is
unique except that multiple optimal resale oﬀers T(bs) may exist for a count-
able number of bids bs > 0. Proposition 2 summarizes these results and also
states the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists for the game with op-
timal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers.
In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium (b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢)), the buyer’s
bid function is given by b1(0) = 0 and (20). The resale oﬀer T(bs) satisﬁes
(21), and is uniquely determined up to a countable number of points bs > 0.
The distribution function H(¢) for the speculator’s bid ˜ bs has the support
[0;b1(1)] and is given by (32) and (33). For all bs > 0, the posterior Π(¢ j bs)
is given by (8), where Á(¢) denotes the inverse of b1(¢).
Proof. Deﬁne b1(¢) by b1(0) = 0 and (20). Deﬁne T(˜ bs) as an arbitrary
solution to (21). Deﬁne H(¢) by (32), and let ˜ bs be a random variable that is
independent of ˜ µ1 and has distribution H(¢). For all bs > 0, deﬁne Π(¢ j bs)
by (8) (note that the speculator cannot win with bs = 0).
We ﬁrst have to verify that this equilibrium (b1(¢);˜ bs;T(¢);Π(¢ j ¢)) is
well-deﬁned. For all µ1 > 0 we have 0 < b1(µ1), implying that b1(¢) is
strictly increasing at 0. Now let µ1 > µ0
1 > 0, let p be a maximand for µ1 in
(20), and let p0 be a maximand for µ0













implying that b1(¢) is strictly increasing. Continuity of b1(¢) was shown in the
proof of Lemma 9. Thus, the inverse Á(¢) of b1(¢) is well-deﬁned, continuous





for all µ1 > 0, implying b < ±T(b) and thus Q(b) > 0 for all b 2 (0;b1(1)],
where we deﬁne
Q(b) = (1 ¡ ±)Á(b) ¡ b + ±T(b):
In particular, the integrand in the deﬁnition of H(¢) is well-deﬁned. More-
over, as in the proof of Lemma 10 one sees that T(¢) is strictly increasing.
Thus, 1=Q(¢) is continuous up to a countable number of points and hence
integrable. Moreover, H(¢) is strictly increasing because 1=Q(¢) > 0.
By deﬁnition, H(¢) is continuous from the right at 0. Note that for any
given ² > 0 we have









Thus, the function Q(¢) is bounded on [²;b1(1)] and thus H(¢) is continuous
in the range [²;b1(1)]. Because ² is arbitrary, we can conclude that H(¢) is





deﬁnes a density for H(¢) because H0(b) = h(b) for all b > 0 where 1=Q(b)
is continuous.
The only equilibrium condition which does not follow directly from the
construction of the equilibrium is (5). Clearly, b1(0) = 0 is the optimal bid
for type 0. Let us now check optimality of b1 = b1(µ1) for types µ1 > 0.
In the following we use the deﬁnition (24). The expected payoﬀ of type
µ1 > 0 with any bid b1 > T¡1(µ1) is
u1(b1;µ1) = H(b1)(µ1 ¡ b1):
This expression is strictly decreasing in the range b1 ¸ b1(1) because H(b1(1)) =
1. It is also strictly decreasing in the range b1 2 [T¡1(µ1);b1(1)] because it
is continuous and for all b1 up to a countable set we have
@u1
@b1
(b1;µ1) = h(b1)(µ1 ¡ b1) ¡ H(b1)
= h(b1)(µ1 ¡ b1 ¡ Q(b1))
21= h(b1)(µ1 ¡ Á(b1) ¡ ±(T(b1) ¡ Á(b1)))
T(b1)>µ1
< h(b1)(1 ¡ ±)(µ1 ¡ Á(b1))
Á(b1)>T(b1)>µ1
< 0:
In the range b1 2 [0;T¡1(µ1)], the utility function takes the form
u1(b1;µ1) = H(b1)(µ1 ¡ b1)
+(H(T¡1(µ1)) ¡ H(b1))±
³
µ1 ¡ E[T(˜ bs) j b1 < ˜ bs · T¡1(µ1)]
´




Moreover, for all ² > 0, the function u1(b1;µ1) is Lipschitz continuous in b1
on [²;T¡1(µ1)], by Lemma 11. Therefore, for all b¤
1 2 (0;T¡1(µ1)],
u1(b¤

















One sees that @u1=@b1 < 0 if µ1 < Á(b1), = if =, and > if <. Therefore,
(34) together with b1(µ1) · T¡1(µ1) implies that b¤
1 = b1(µ1) is the optimal
bid among the bids 6= 0, for all µ1 > 0. A deviation to the bid 0 is not
proﬁtable because u1(b1;µ1) is continuous in b1 at b1 = 0. This completes
the existence proof.
The uniqueness-part follows from Lemma 9, Lemma 10, and Lemma 12.
QED
The equilibrium that we have constructed survives multiple speculators.
A second speculator would also make 0 expected proﬁts from any bid in
[0;b1(1)]. Therefore, it is optimal to stay out. On the other hand, there are
many equilibria with multiple speculators which have the same form as the
one that we have constructed, except that the distribution function for the
maximum among all speculators’ bids must be deﬁned by (32) and (33).
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the opportunity for resale can decrease the expected
social surplus in a ﬁrst-price auction with asymmetric bidders. At the same
22time, the resale opportunity can increase the seller’s expected revenue. Hav-
ing obtained these results for the extreme asymmetric case of one privately
informed bidder and one 0-value bidder, similar results might be expected for
any ﬁrst-price auction with “suﬃciently asymmetric” independent- private-
value bidders.8 Computing equilibria might, however, be diﬃcult, given the
complexity of ﬁrst-price auctions with asymmetric bidder even when resale
is not possible. Gupta and Lebrun (1999) compute equilibria when resale is
possible, but assume common knowledge of values at the resale stage. Not
making this simplifying assumption, the current paper contains the ﬁrst con-
struction of an equilibrium in a ﬁrst-price auction with asymmetric bidders
and resale.
Our other main result is that a 0-value trader cannot make proﬁts in a
ﬁrst-price auction. We have obtained this result only for the special case
of 2-bidder auction with a single privately informed bidder. On the other
hand, no restricting assumptions on the resale market rules were needed.
Throughout the paper, we have assumed that the losing bids remain
private. The analysis would be quite diﬀerent if the losing bids were pub-
licly announced. In particular, a strictly increasing bid function would fully
reveal a buyer’s value to the resale market. No equilibrium for the case of
asymmetric bidders and publicly announced losing bids is currently known
in the literature.9
Arguably, the most basic insight of our paper is that ﬁrst-price auctions
are sometimes not speculation-proof, in the sense that if possible entry of
a speculator (i.e., a 0-value trader) is ignored (so that private-value buy-
ers’ strategies are best-responses only to each other), a speculator will be
attracted to the auction and make proﬁts via resale. A ﬁrst-price auction
with a single private-value buyer is not speculation-proof because the buyer
would bid 0 in the absence of a speculator. Auctions with multiple symmet-
ric independent-private-value buyers are sometimes not speculation-proof
either. This can be seen in the case where losing bids are announced. Sup-
pose, for example, there are two buyers with independent private values,
each distributed uniformly on [0;1], and the resale seller makes an optimal
8The other extreme is the case of symmetric bidders. Haile (1999, Theorem 1) has
shown for any number of bidders that the no-resale equilibrium remains valid, and thus
no resale occurs, when resale becomes possible; this holds even if the resale seller can
extract all gains from resale trade.
9Krishna (2002, Section 4.4) for two asymmetric bidders with independent private
values distributed on the same support, shows that any equilibrium will be ineﬃcient if
the resale mechanism is an optimal take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. However, Krishna does not
show the existence of an equilibrium.
23take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. Suppose buyers ignore possible entry of a specula-
tor. It is then optimal for each buyer to bid 1=2 her value and consume the
good if she wins. Therefore, a speculator who steps in with the bid bs = 1=2
wins for sure and from the observed losing bids she infers the maximum
value among buyers, which has the expectation 2=3. The speculator’s ex-
pected payoﬀ equals ±(2=3)¡bs, which is positive for ± close to 1. Thus, the
auction is not speculation-proof.
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